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TOWARD U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
BRUCE BROOMHALL*
I
INTRODUCTION
Since the Rome Diplomatic Conference was concluded in July 1998 with the
adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the “ICC”),1
the United States has been seeking accommodation of what it calls “fundamen-
tal concerns” with the final text.2  This effort has most recently taken place
through the meetings of the ICC Preparatory Commission (“PrepCom”).3
The endeavor has been a frustrating one for the United States.  Unable to
offer credible “carrots,” decisive “sticks,” or viable legal arguments, the United
States finds itself on “a lonely legal ledge,”4 able neither to go forward nor to
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1. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter the Rome Statute], as corrected by the procés-
verbaux of Nov. 10, 1998 and July 12, 1999.  For a survey of efforts to establish an international criminal
court up to and through the Rome Conference, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1998).  For the negotiating dy-
namics of the Conference, see Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an Interna-
tional Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 A.J.I.L.  A detailed examination of the negotiation
of various parts of the statute is found in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ISSUES,
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).  An article-by-article explication of the statute is
found in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
2. David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 A.J.I.L. 12, 21
(1999).
3. The PrepCom was established by General Assembly Resolution 53/105, pursuant to Resolution
F of the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998).  The task of the PrepCom
is to negotiate subsidiary instruments (in particular the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Ele-
ments of Crimes, which were adopted in draft on June 30, 2000, see U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.1 (July 12, 2000) and PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Ad.2 (July 6, 2000)) in addition to
“discuss ways to enhance the effectiveness and acceptance of the Court,” see U.N. Doc. A/Res/53/105 ¶
4 (1999).  The latter language was inserted in order to give the United States the opportunity to air its
concerns through the PrepCom process.
4. Ruth Wedgwood, Courting disaster: The U.S. Takes a Stand, FOR. SERV. J., Mar. 2000, at 34,
39.
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step back.  Asking for concessions it cannot win in a process it can neither leave
nor oppose, the United States has so far resisted coming to terms with the limits
of its ability to control the ICC process.  It has also resisted the recognition that
its reasons to support the ICC far outweigh its reasons to oppose it.  That its
eventual support for the ICC (if only as a non-party) is nonetheless highly likely
is argued below.
II
THE U.S. NEGOTIATING AIM AND “FLAWS” IN THE ROME STATUTE
When it refers to “flaws” in the Rome Statute,5 the United States refers to
the ICC’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party states to
the statute without the consent of those states.6  The U.S. government sees in
this the possibility of U.S. personnel being investigated for war crimes by an in-
ternational tribunal.  That the court would be able to do so only when the na-
tional of the non-party state is suspected on reasonable grounds of committing
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes on the territory of a state
party,7 and where the state of nationality (among others) is found unwilling or
unable to proceed genuinely against the individual,8 has not so far been consid-
ered sufficiently reassuring.  For the states that have ratified or that are moving
toward ratification of the Rome Statute, the jurisdictional scheme is simply a
delegation to the ICC of the territorial and national jurisdiction that states un-
doubtedly enjoy under international law: The ICC will do nothing more than
what these states have the right to do, and only when they are unwilling or un-
able to do it.9  The United States argues that the possible investigation and
prosecution of its nationals without its consent is tantamount to the imposition
of treaty obligations on a third statesomething expressly disallowed by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.10  For others, to allow the state of
nationality of the accused to decide whether its nationals would be prosecuted
5. Scheffer, supra note 2, at 17.
6. See The Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12 (Pre-Conditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction).
Under art. 12(1), a state party accepts the court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.  Under art. 12(2), the adherence to the statute of either the state
where the crime took place (the “territorial state”) or the state of nationality of the suspect or accused
(the “national state”) is necessary for the court to exercise its jurisdiction.  Under art. 12(3), a territorial
or national state that is not party to the statute may accept the court’s jurisdiction ad hoc for purposes
of a particular crime.  Both “automatic jurisdiction” and the requirement of a territorial or national
nexus were extremely contentious in the process leading to the adoption of the statute.  See Elizabeth
Wilmshurst, The Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at
127; Sharon A. Williams, Article 12, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 329.
7. See arts. 15, 53, 58.
8. See arts. 17, 18, 19.
9. See Kirsch & Holmes, supra note 1, at 1.
10. See Scheffer, supra note 2, at 18.  The most detailed explication, broadly sympathetic to the
United States, of the legal argument is Madeline Morris, High crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and
Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Winter 2001).  For a short critique of the legality
argument, see Diane F. Orentlicher, Politics by Other Means: The Law of the International Criminal
Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 489 (1999).
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would be a retreat from the Nuremberg principle that an individual cannot find
immunity behind the veil of the state.11
The U.S. legal argument arises from deeper concerns.  At least some (par-
ticularly military) decisionmakers are concerned that the ability of the United
States to project force abroad will be constrained by possible ICC investigation
into the actions of U.S. personnel on the territory either of a party to the statute
or of a state consenting ad hoc to the ICC’s jurisdiction.  The U.S. government,
in the context of an overall aim of entrenching post-Cold War U.S. pre-
eminence in international affairs, is seeking to prevent the emergence of a pos-
sible curb on the latitude available to the U.S. military in acting as an arm of
U.S. foreign policy.  That such latitude might encompass actions in at least the
grey zone of legality could only exacerbate this concern.12
The aim of post-Rome U.S. efforts has been to raise the comfort level of
ICC skeptics within the U.S. government, in particular by limiting the court’s
effective powers with respect to non-party states.  In its extreme (and currently
favored) form, this exercise seeks a “fix” in the form of a “magic bullet” pro-
posal that would resolve concerns through a de facto or de lege amendment to
the Rome Statute.  At the same time, there appears to have been debate within
the relevant agencies of government as to what would constitute adequate pro-
tection with respect to which concerns.  Intimately tied to this debate has been
the question of the legal form such a fix should take.  If “100% protection”
were to be the watchword, then a protocol or an amendment to the statute
would be necessary, with all the political hurdles this would present.  If full pro-
tection were to entail something less than this, then a binding understanding (of
the PrepCom or of the eventual Assembly of States Parties) or an addition to
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence might have sufficed.
Without exploring in detail the policies and institutional interests behind
U.S. efforts, the remainder of this essay will examine the search for an accom-
modation of U.S. concerns in the context of the dynamics of the PrepCom to
the end of the June 2000 session.  In light of this analysis, the conclusion will ar-
gue that the search for a legal fix is inevitably quixotic and that early reconcilia-
tion with the ICC would best serve U.S. interests.
11. See Orentlicher, supra note 10, at 490-95.
12. See, e.g., Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authori-
zations to Use Force, Cease-fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 A.J.I.L. 124 (1999); Bruno Simma,
NATO, the U.N. and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 E.J.I.L. 1 (1999).  The place of the ICC in the
geopolitical framework of U.S. interests at the end of the 20th century has, to the knowledge of this
author, not been adequately explored to date.  But see A World Court for Criminals, ECONOMIST, Oct.
9, 1999, at 19 (arguing that U.S. opposition to the court is contrary to its larger interest in world order);
Wedgwood, supra note 4 (taking a sympathetic view of U.S. concerns).  For more general views finding
an overriding U.S. interest in multilateralism, see America’s World, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1999, and
Sherle R. Schwenninger, World Order Lost: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World,
WORLD POL’Y J. 42 (Summer 1999).
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III
CONSTRAINTS ON THE U.S. SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED “FIX”
Any U.S. proposal or proposals would have to receive support from a con-
trolling number of states engaged in the ICC process.  The United States would
have to create a common understanding of the problem as well as a sympathy
toward its position from at least key leaders among the states involved.  This
raises questions as to limits set by the international situation and by positions
taken by those countries that would have to agree to any accommodation.
At the time of writing, there are 114 signatories and twenty-one ratifications
to the Rome Statute.13  By the end of the year 2000, a majority of the fifteen
member states of the European Union are expected to have ratified the statute.
Adherence to the statute by these states will secure for the court the political
leadership and financial viability that others are looking for as a precondition to
their own support.  As a result, many of the twenty-nine sub-Saharan African
and the dozen Central and Eastern European states that have so far signed the
statute are expected to accelerate their processes of ratification.  Although pre-
dictions vary, it is safe to say that, barring any geopolitical calamity, the Rome
Treaty will enter into force and the court will be established within the first
decade (or even half-decade) of the new century.14  Despite sparse Asian and
Middle-Eastern support, the first Assembly of States Parties is likely to include
representatives from all regions of the globe.
Importantly, it is likely to include all U.S. NATO allies, with the exception
of Turkey, as well as two of the five permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil (France and the United Kingdom).
From the viewpoint of U.S. diplomatic efforts, the pending establishment of
the Court reduces the inclination of at least signatory states to modify arrange-
ments under the statute.  The like-minded group of countries supporting the
early establishment of an effective ICC has publicly affirmed its support for the
integrity of the Rome Statute in Europe, the United Nations, and other fora.
These countries could not be seen to retreat from this position without consid-
erable loss of face.  Signatories with significant international military commit-
ments, like the United Kingdom and France, have decided that the statute pro-
vides adequate safeguards to meet their concerns.
Moreover, these countries were among the majority at the Diplomatic Con-
ference that supported what amounted to universal jurisdiction for the court,15
13. Ratifications through October 18, 2000 include Belgium, Belize, Botswana, Canada, Fiji,
France, Gabon, Ghana, Iceland, Italy, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mali, New Zealand, Norway, San Mar-
ino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
14. The most informative and up-to-date source on signature, ratification, and implementation of
the Rome Statute is found at the “Country-by-country Ratification Status Report” and “Ratification
Atlas” at the web-site of the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court.  See <http://www.
iccnow.org>.
15. See The Proposal of the Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.6, art. 8 (June 18,
1998), proposed that the court be able to exercise its jurisdiction if any of four states was party to the
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that decisively rejected the suggestion that the exercise of jurisdiction should be
based on consent of the state of nationality alone,16 and that, without U.S. urg-
ing, might well have created an independent prosecutor without the constraints
now seen, in particular, in Articles 15 and 18 of the statute.  These states are
mindful that the jurisdictional arrangement is a compromise much narrower
than that favored by the large majority at Rome, and is indeed one adopted
primarily to placate the United States.17  For the United States, facing resistance
to any return to the debates of Rome, only a significant new argument attract-
ing international assent or an offer of a tangible and attractive quid pro quo
could move other states in its direction.
Yet it is precisely the lack of an adequate bargaining chip that has hampered
U.S. efforts to date.  The United States’ engagement in the PrepCom sessions
has given it an incentive to stay involved through the first Assembly of States
Parties, making a withdrawal or opposition (the main negative incentives in
U.S. hands) seem implausible.  The United States has been unable to offer a
promise of signaturemuch less of ratificationand its support for the court
(whether political, financial, or diplomatic), being contingent on the changeable
politics of the Executive and Congress, cannot be offered in advance.  Other
governments (and in particular those that can be expected to carry the main fi-
nancial burden) have made the calculation that the court will be viable on the
basis of their support alone—that is, without the United States.  Needless to
say, these countries would prefer to have U.S. financial and diplomatic re-
sources behind the court.  But with the ICC as defined by the Rome Statute a
pending reality, the United States has been unable to offer anything sufficiently
tangible by way of carrots or sticks to make substantial modifications seem war-
ranted.
In addition to isolation in its concerns and uncertainty in its bargaining
power, the United States has to contend with a restricted time frame.  The
search for accommodation is not subject to a deadline as such, but it is shaped
by key dates.  Any “fix” involving the Rules of Procedure and Evidence was
constrained by the deadline of June 30, 2000 for completion of the draft rules.18
Later PrepCom sessions would impose similar limits on other instruments.19
The United States might hypothetically persuade the Assembly of States Parties
statute (or consented ad hoc): the territorial state, the state of nationality of the victim or of the ac-
cused, and the state with custody of the accused.
16. See Proposal of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.70 (July 14, 1998).
17. According to an NGO survey published a week before the end of the conference (The Interna-
tional Criminal Court Monitor (July 10, 1998)), 79% of the states favoured the Korean proposal, supra
note 15.
18. See Resolution F of the Final Act, supra note 3, ¶ 6.
19. General Assembly Resolution 54/105 provided for a two-week session in November-December
2000 for negotiations related to issues other than the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Ele-
ments of Crime, which occupied the bulk of the PrepCom agenda to June 30, 2000: U.N. Doc.
A/Res/54/105 (1999).  Given the scope of the items involved (rules of procedure of the Assembly of
States Parties, financial rules and regulations, a relationship agreement between the ICC and the U.N.,
and more), further sessions in 2001 will be necessary.
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to support a proposal in its favor at any time, raising the possibility that the
search for a “fix” will resurface from time to time in that forum.  Nonetheless,
the PrepCom presents the most likely opportunity for the United States.
IV
THE PROBLEM WITH A “FIX”
The United States has been unsuccessful in its attempt to find accommoda-
tion for a mix of formal and substantive reasons.  Formally, the degree of insu-
lation available would be highest with an amendment or a protocol to the stat-
ute.20  The argument challenging the legality of the statute was intended in large
measure to prepare the ground for such a remedy.  The degree of sustained po-
litical support needed for the argument and the political cost for the like-
minded countries of entering into any apparent retreat from their position of
support for the integrity of the statute have led the United States to abandon
this option in favor of “softer” ones.21
Substantively, the U.S. aim of preventing prosecution of its nationals abroad
raises fundamental problems that have plagued U.S. attempts to win support.
In essence, this is because other governments are not inclined and can see no
compelling reason of principle to make a pure exception for the United States
alone.  At the same time, no principled general accommodation has presented
itself that would meet the needs of the United States without opening a loop-
hole through which myriad injustices would flow.
The U.S. delegation at the March 2000 PrepCom circulated an informal
proposal that illustrates well problems that arise with attempts to find accom-
modation for its concerns.22  The proposal would prevent the court from pro-
ceeding where the national of a non-party is involved, and the state of national-
ity acknowledges that the individual was acting under its “overall direction,”
unless (1) the state of nationality consents or (2) the Security Council passes a
resolution against the directing state under Chapter VII of the Charter, author-
20. Substantive amendments require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of States
Parties, followed by ratification by seven-eighths of them, creating a very high threshold for changing
the statute.  See art. 121(5).  A protocol to the statute would presumably require signature and ratifica-
tion by all states parties.
21. During the November-December 1999 and March 2000 sessions of the PrepCom, the U.S.
delegation placed less emphasis on the argument of legality than it had done previously.  This appears
to have been for tactical reasons, as states supportive of the court might be less inclined to make con-
cessions to the United States in negotiations if they felt that to do so would be to concede the argument
that the jurisdictional principles embedded in the Rome Statute—which they find clear and accept-
able—somehow contravened the international law of treaties.  The United States has not conceded the
Rome Statute’s legality, however, and would be likely to raise this issue if the Court were ever to indict
a U.S. national.
22. Formally, the proposal has two parts.  The substance of the proposal would be in the Relation-
ship Agreement between the U.N. and the ICC, to be negotiated at the November-December Prep-
Com.  A rule of procedure was also proposed to make clear that the Relationship Agreement would be
considered an international agreement for purposes of Art. 98(1), which exempts states from their obli-
gation to surrender an individual to the ICC in case of conflicting obligations.  Article 98(1) was in-
tended to make allowance for Status of Forces Agreements or SOFAs.  See supra note 28 and accom-
panying text.
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izing the continuation of proceedings.  While the proposal would stop the court
only at the stage of surrender, and differs from past efforts in that respect, the
three key features of this proposal are bound to raise familiar difficulties.
First, the threshold requirement that the state of nationality of the accused
acknowledge its “overall direction” of the individual is in essence the same “of-
ficial acts” exception that was proposed by the United States and subsequently
rejected at Rome.23  The requirement that a non-party state acknowledge that
an individual was engaged in official acts is intended to confine the exception to
situations in which a state was willing so to acknowledge.  However, the pro-
posal would allow states to block ICC jurisdiction over their nationals (and for
the most serious crimes conceivable), would do so when those crimes were al-
legedly committed on the territory of a state party to the statute (which would
normally itself be able to exercise jurisdiction), would not require the state of
nationality to investigate or prosecute itself, and would provide no effective
control to ensure that the acknowledgement was made in good faith.  For many
of those who rejected this concept at Rome, it would be a clear retreat from the
Nuremberg principles to allow the state of a person accused of genocide, crimes
against humanity, or war crimes to block proceedings in this way.24  The second
feature of the proposal, state of nationality consent, raises the same objection
and was similarly rejected at Rome.
The third key feature, that of Security Council approval, revisits the position
advanced by the United States through the early stages of the Rome Confer-
ence.25  Whatever the value of arguments about the priority due to the Security
Council in its actions to maintain or restore international peace and security
under Chapter VII of the Charter, the granting of control over court proceed-
ings to the Security Council has been strongly resisted.  Such control would al-
low inequitable protection of the nationals of permanent members of the Coun-
cil (as well as the nationals of their proxy and client states), and has thus been
criticised for institutionalizing inequality before the law.  This is inflamed by the
North-South issues heaped on this critique by members of the Non-Aligned
Movement and others.  Given that the issue of Security Council control was de-
bated and settled at Rome, bestowing upon the Council a right to delay court
23. Proposal of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.90, art. 7 (July 16,
1998).
24. See Nuremberg Charter; Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agree-
ment for the Prosecution & Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, London, Aug.
8, 1945, arts. 7-8, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in (1945) A.J.I.L. (Supp.) 257; see also Principles of Interna-
tional Law Recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal:
Report of the International Law Commission, princs. 3–4, 5 U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N.
Doc.. A/1316 at 11 (1950).
25. The analogy is not exact, since the March 2000 proposal would require Security Council ap-
proval only once the court was to seek surrender of the accused, rather than prevent proceedings from
the start.  The proposal is also narrower than the previous position, in that it would require a Security
Council resolution taking measures against the state of nationality as a precondition to the surrender of
nationals of that state to the court.  Proceedings could continue as prescribed by the statute with re-
spect to nationals of e.g. the state on the territory of which the crime was alleged.
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proceedings,26 the United States’ ability to win support to revisit this issue has
been far from sufficient.27
Despite these shortcomings, the adoption of a Rule of Procedure28 seen by
the United States as laying the foundation for further negotiation toward an ex-
emption at the November-December PrepCom ensures that this issue will be
pursued, in spite of the slim prospects for success.29
V
THE ARGUMENT FOR U.S. SUPPORT
If a full “fix” for the United States is unlikely to succeed on the ground that
it would amount to a re-opening of the statute or a reversal of the “Nuremberg
precedent,” the United States will have to recognize that it must content itself
not with a single “fix,” but with a mosaic of provisions in the Rules, Elements of
Crimes, and other PrepCom texts.  Although possible exposure to the court’s
jurisdiction (at least in principle, and to a greater or lesser degree) will not have
changed, these will leave the United States with more reassurance than it had
after adoption of the statute.
Such exposure to ICC jurisdiction is not incompatible with U.S. support for
the ICC.  The institutional interest of the Defence Department in preserving its
latitude as U.S. foreign policy’s enforcer of last resort in the post-Cold War en-
vironment makes its opposition to the ICC rational from its own institutional
point of view.  However, this is only one of several U.S. interests.  If one accepts
that the ICC is going to come into existence and is going to do so in a form that
leaves a degree of U.S. exposure to its jurisdiction, and acceptance of these
propositions is increasingly unavoidable, U.S. opposition to the court becomes
questionable as a possible stance, even if it could emerge in time to make a sig-
nificant difference (which is highly doubtful).  Such a stance would be difficult
to maintain and would entail significant disadvantages for the United States.
PrepCom negotiations offer the United States an opportunity to introduce
clarity, safeguards, and sometimes restrictions on the court’s powers.  Opposi-
26. See The Rome Statute, ch. VII res. (art. 16).
27. At the June 2000 PrepCom, Ambassador Scheffer recognized concerns raised by the Security
Council’s role in the U.S. proposal, and has indicated that the proposal may undergo modifications in
this respect.  No modified proposal had formally appeared at the time of writing.
28. Rule 9.19 states as follows: “The Court may not proceed with a request for the surrender of a
person without the consent of the sending [s]tate if, under article 98, paragraph 2, such a request would
be inconsistent with obligations under an international agreement pursuant to which the consent of a
sending [s]tate is required prior to the surrender of a person of that State to the Court.”  Draft Rules,
supra note 3.
29. Delegates at the June PrepCom were careful to insert language in the final report of the session
indicating that adoption of Rule 9.19 did not entail any concession of substance.  An “Understanding in
connection with Rule 9.19 for incorporation into the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission”
reads as follows: “It is generally understood that Rule 9.19 should not be interpreted as requiring or in
any way calling for the negotiation of provisions in any particular international agreement by the
[c]ourt or by any other international organization or [s]tate.”  A number of delegates also indicated pri-
vately that it was their intention to keep the United States engaged in the process for as long as possi-
ble, without ultimately conceding any exemption.
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tion or withdrawal would eliminate the United States’ ability to take advantage
of this, not just with respect to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the
Elements of Crime, but also with respect to other instruments yet to be negoti-
ated, including the definition of aggression.  Withdrawal would reduce U.S. lev-
erage in the eventual Assembly of States Parties to prevent adverse amendment
of text introduced in its favor.  Opposition would multiply this effect, making
adverse revision by the Assembly all the more likely.  It would also contribute
to a general perception that the United States was in some way opposed to the
rule of law or to accountability for the worst violations of human rights.  Fur-
ther, the value of opposing the court must be weighed against the likelihood of
its having the desired effect (of preventing the statute’s entry into force).  In
fact, the process of ratification is too far advanced for the United States to re-
tard it seriously, and the costs of withdrawal are too great for the United States
to bear without serious reason to believe it could accomplish something
thereby.  The best conclusion is that the United States has gained too much
both during and after Rome to step out of this process.
The most compelling reason for rejecting an all or nothing approach to a
U.S. “fix” is the near inevitability of U.S. support for the ICC.  For some State
Department planners, eventual U.S. support or, at least, eventual U.S. ability to
avail itself of the court must have a certain appeal.  When the next Kosovo, East
Timor, Rwanda, or Sierra Leone erupts on the international stage, will the
United States refuse to support accountability merely because the ICC is the
only viable means of obtaining it?  For that it certainly will be.  Future ad hoc
tribunals, already considered unlikely, will be even less likely with France and
the United Kingdom as parties to the Rome Statute, which offers structure for
accepting Security Council referrals without the cost of establishing new tribu-
nals.  Even were the United States to resist the temptation to acquiesce in a Se-
curity Council referral, and instead relied on its veto, proprio motu actions by
the prosecutor and state referrals might still “arise.”  Where the crime was
egregious and the public clamour for justice significant, could the United States
resist calls to provide diplomatic or other support and let its allies take the
credit for promoting accountability?  This seems unlikely.  It is far more likely
that a future U.S. government will see the political advantage in supporting a
prosecution in the court, if only as a matter of raw political calculation.30
Other states involved in the process recognize the substantial reasons for
eventual U.S. support for the Court.  This does not mean that bona fide efforts
30. The U.S. Government itself now acknowledges this.  In remarks before the House Interna-
tional Relations Committee on 26 July 2000, Ambassador David Scheffer stated:
We anticipate there will be instances in which it will be in the national interest to respond to
requests for cooperation even if the United States is not a party to the ICC Treaty.  We may
decide that an international investigation and prosecution of a Pol Pot, a Saddam Hussein, an
Idi Amin, a Foday Sankoh, or some other rogue leader . . . would be in the national interest of
the United States to support.
Transcript of Remarks at 2 (on file with the author).
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will not be made to increase the “comfort level” of the United States31—it only
means that states see little reason to weaken a court that the United States is
unlikely to oppose and has a number of good reasons to support.32
VI
CONCLUSION
At present, the United States is bound up in more than a debate about the
jurisdiction of the court.  It is caught up in a series of processes that will ulti-
mately shape the U.S. role in the geopolitical environment of the twenty-first
century.  The respective values of multilateralism and unilateralism, of isola-
tionism and the support for an infrastructure of global governance, of “soft
power” and the role of the military, are all under debate.  This is unfortunate, as
the ICC itself has at best an ambiguous place in these larger debates and is to
some extent held hostage by them.  The long-term U.S. interest in international
justice would by itself clearly dictate early and sustained U.S. support for the
ICC, evenand arguably especiallywithout the much sought-after “fix.”
Over the course of 2000 and 2001, the United States will have to take a se-
ries of decisions.  These decisions will not foreclose efforts by the United States
to ensure that the ICC operates to the extent possible in conformity with U.S.
priorities and with sensitivity to U.S. interests.  They should, however, allow the
ICC to become an accepted part of U.S. foreign policy discourse, and by so do-
ing remove one impediment to coherence in the views of justice and account-
ability.
While U.S. concerns are not irrational, as such, they are unlikely to be satis-
fied through PrepCom negotiations.  Rather, the United States will probably
have to content itself with making its concerns known, and then by responding
on a case-by-case basis in the unlikely event that investigation of U.S. personnel
should arise.  Meanwhile, the United States would be undermining its own in-
terests by insisting on insulation of its personnel as the price for its toleration or
support for the ICC.  Rather, the United States ought, in its own interest, to lay
the foundations for eventually supporting the court, notwithstanding the poten-
tial (albeit remote) risk of investigation of its nationals.  While defence interests
31. For example, one like-minded government has privately suggested an extension of Article 124
of the statute to non-party states.  Article 124 allows states, upon becoming party to the statute, to de-
clare for up to seven years that they do not accept the court’s jurisdiction over war crimes.  Extending
this to non-parties would give the United States until approximately 2010 to watch the development of
the ICC before deciding what stance to take.  The proposal has not been pursued, however, as it ap-
pears to fall too far below the benchmarks for “protection” that the United States has set for itself.  See
Diane F. Orentlicher, International Criminal Tribunals: An Institution the United States Can Support,
unpublished paper presented at America’s National Interests in Multilateral Engagement: A Bipartisan
Dialogue, at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 14-15, 2000 (on file
with the author).
32. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy made this clear when he stated: “Let’s continue to
work and massage and accommodate . . . .  But there has to be flexibility on the U.S. side.  They have to
adjust their sights now too and recognize that they are not going to get an exemption from this court.”
Barbara Crossette, U.S. Resists War-Crimes Court as Canada Conforms, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2000, at
A4.
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would promote their own agenda as they have, the U.S. interest in the court dic-
tates that the Executive resolve conflict between agency interests by putting the
long-term, broad U.S. interest firmly at the center of its foreign policy.  Signa-
ture of the Rome Statute would be one expression of this approach.
